



I use “bank” to mean 
“depository institution.”
 









wenty-ﬁve years ago, the banking
system used two forms of monetary
base—vault cash and deposit balances
at Reserve Banks—in just two ways:
required reserves and excess reserves.1
Now, the banking system uses those same
two forms of monetary base in four ways:
required reserves, contracted clearing bal-
ances, surplus vault cash, and excess
reserve deposit balances.  The two
additional uses—surplus vault cash and
contracted clearing balances—account for
about 90 percent of banks’ holdings of
monetary base that are not used to satisfy
reserve requirements.  The remaining 10
percent, averaging about $1 billion for the
past decade, is labeled “excess reserves.” 
Anderson and Rasche recognize the
declining proportion of required reserves
in the banking system’s demand for mone-
tary base.  They determine from panel data
that some subsets of banks are not likely to
be affected by changes in reserve
requirements because their operating
needs for monetary base exceed required
amounts.  These non-required needs for
base money show up in the Board’s data
series as the sum of surplus vault cash,
contracted clearing balances, and excess
reserves.  Accordingly, Anderson and
Rasche reduce the magnitude of the
reserve adjustment used to derive the St.
Louis measure of the adjusted monetary
base.  An irony of this exercise is our rela-
tive uncertainty about the relationship
between the price level and various
measures of the money stock that are mul-
tiples of the monetary base.  Nonetheless,
continued publication of a consistent mea-
sure of the adjusted base is useful as a
check on policy actions and as an
historical record.
The innovation to the reserve
adjustment procedure may seem some-
what crude.  It is  capable only of saying
whether subsets of banks are bound or not
bound by reserve requirements.  It is
unable to capture the degree to which
some banks might be sliding from one
state to the other.  Nonetheless, the new,
revised adjusted monetary base represents
a major step forward.  Further tests with
future panel data will enable St. Louis to
update the reserve adjustment magnitude
in the years ahead, in recognition of the
headlong movement of the American
banking system toward the elimination of




Without wanting in any way to depre-
cate the enormous job Anderson and
Rasche have done, I would like to
highlight two jobs that remain to be done.
One is terminological, and the other is def-
initional—a ﬁne distinction, but useful.
The terminological job is for those who
publish the data and those who use it to
settle on a common, simple set of terms to
attach to the components of the monetary
base and bank reserves—or should I say
“depository institution” reserves?  Over
the past ﬁve years, I myself have followed
the changing usage of the research
community by referring to “required
clearing balances,” then “contractual
clearing balances,” and now, following
Anderson and Rasche, “contracted clearing
balances,” while the Federal Reserve Bul-
letin refers to the same data either as
“service-related balances and adjustments,”
or “required clearing balances and adjust-
ments to compensate for ﬂoat.”  And are
all of banks’ holdings of deposits at the
Reserve Banks “reserve deposits,” “reserve
balances,” “deposits,” or “balances”?  And
why do we have to say “banks’ holdings of
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monetary base,” or “banks’ holdings of
vault cash and deposit balances at the
Reserve Banks” rather than just “banks’
cash”?  Perhaps the 13 Research Directors
could sponsor a Terminological Convention
at which delegates could agree on a simple,
standard lexicon.
The second job that remains to be done
concerns deﬁnitions of data series, regardless
of the terminology used in their tags.  Those
of us with a morbid interest in the imple-
mentation of monetary policy also have
recognized the headlong rush of the
American banking system toward the elimi-
nation of required reserve portfolio
constraints.  Especially since the 1990-91
reduction in reserve requirements, the
growth of contracted clearing balances has
demonstrated how policy implementation
interacts with the wholesale payments busi-
ness.  Not only the ﬁnesse, but sometimes
even the gross results of policy actions may
be affected in the short run by banks’
management of their balances at the Reserve
Banks.  Yet there are some obvious difﬁcul-
ties with the data reporting the allocation of
Reserve Bank deposits among the various
components.  Anderson and Rasche politely
mention these problems but don’t belabor
them.  I will, because imprecise information
risks confusion in, and about, both the mon-
etary policy and ﬁnancial services functions
of Reserve Banks.  As Anderson and Rasche’s
work makes clear, monetary policy imple-
mentation increasingly piggy-backs on the
balances that banks maintain purely for
operational purposes, to manage daylight
and overnight overdraft risks in making
payments, and to receive earnings credits
with which to pay for Reserve Bank
payment services.
One difﬁculty is that the current deﬁni-
tion of excess reserves includes items that
are not excess and other items that are not
reserves.  This problem did not originate
with the clearing balance facility; carryover
of a portion of a bank’s reserve position is a
long-standing provision of Regulation D.
The power to shift demand for balances
between adjacent maintenance periods
declines as required reserves shrink.  The
clearing balance facility, however, with its
penalty-free target balance range, now pro-
vides a partial alternative to using carryover,
in addition to affecting the amount that is
capable of being carried over.
EXCESS RESERVES:
A “SLIPPERY NOTION”
The notion of excess reserves has
always been slippery.  In a mechanical
textbook model of multiple expansion of
deposits, reserves in excess of require-
ments are simply wasted reserves—
unnecessary non-interest-bearing balances
on deposit with Reserve Banks during a
reserve maintenance period.  But we know
better than that, or if we don’t, we haven’t
read Bill Dewald’s succinct explanation in
the St. Louis Bank’s 
 
Monetary Trends last
month.  There, Dewald points out that the
lion’s share of the difference between
required reserves and the aggregate of
banks’ holdings of vault cash and deposits
at the Federal Reserve Banks clearly is not
wasted.  Banks hold clearing balances to
facilitate execution of their own and their
customers’ payments.  And they hold sur-
plus vault cash—the excess of vault cash
over reserve requirements of those banks
that meet their requirement entirely with
vault cash—to meet operating needs to
stock ATM machines and tellers’ stations.  
The problem with applying the Dewal-
dian concept of excess reserves after
deducting clearing balances and surplus
vault cash is that it seems unlikely to give
rise to a signiﬁcant demand for non-
interest-bearing balances, just because of
the cost involved.  Pure excess reserves
were a cheap source of overdraft protection
and liquidity in the late 1930s, when the
three-month bill rate was only a couple of
basis points above zero.  But now, with the
funds rate more than a hundred-fold
higher than that, installing alternative pro-
tections against daylight and overnight
overdrafts should be cheaper than deliber-
ately holding non-interest-bearing
balances.  
Several alternatives come to mind.  A
bank might invest in a more sophisticated
balance management system, to reduce the
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incidence of surprise debits and credits
that might cause overdrafts or surpluses.
Or, a bank might arrange to make and
receive more payments over a net
settlement network like CHIPS, on which
a bank’s network partners absorb daylight
imbalances between ﬂows of debits and
credits.  The cost of this alternative is
likely to involve using some interest-
bearing collateral as a network guarantee.
Or, as a third alternative, a bank simply
could increase the size of its contracted
clearing balance at a Reserve Bank.  A
larger contracted clearing balance at least
earns interest at the level of the federal
funds rate, although the earnings can be
used only to pay for ﬁnancial services
bought from a Reserve Bank.
THE “HOT POTATO”
RESERVES PHENOMENON
In addition to wondering why banks
might demand a signiﬁcant volume of pure
excess reserves, there are reasons to suspect
that measured excess reserves may not
always reﬂect a demand at all.  Some of the
balances that show up in measured excess
reserves might represent an excess supply
of balances that, like hot potatoes, get
tossed around from bank to bank during a
day until, at the end of the day, the unfor-
tunate last holders are stuck with the
things until opening of business
next day.  
Once open market operations create
balances on a day, there’s not much the
banking system can do immediately to get
rid of an excess supply.  Of course, being
stuck with an unwanted balance overnight
need not imply being stuck with an
unwanted balance on average for a two-
week reserve maintenance period.  All that
a single bank has to do to get rid of an
overnight excess balance is to reduce its
overnight balance by an equal and
offsetting amount the next day, or by 1/nth
of that amount daily for the n days
remaining in a maintenance period, or by
an average of 1/14th of that amount each
day of the succeeding maintenance period
if the amount is small enough to ﬁt within
the reserve carryover provision.  Of course,
only banks that must satisfy a reserve
requirement can do this.  Other banks
might average over a maintenance period
to ﬁt within the penalty-free range for a
clearing balance, if they had contracted for
one.  An excessive over-night balance is
simply wasted if a bank faces neither a
clearing balance for averaging and a penalty-
free band, nor a reserve requirement for
averaging and carryover.
The “hot potato” explanation of excess
reserves as an excess supply phenomenon
may sound ﬁshy for another reason.  If
reserves are in excess supply, the Desk
should notice that the funds rate is falling.
Even if the Desk doesn’t have an opportu-
nity to take back an excess supply, the fact
that the funds rate falls as the market
works to equilibrate quantity demanded
and quantity supplied, suggests that there
will be no excess in either demand or
supply.  Increasingly, however, the funds
market may not work so predictably.  The
funds rate may not fully adjust to an over-
abundance of reserves in a maintenance
period if banks have difﬁculty working off
an unexpectedly large end-of-day balance
over succeeding days.  The value of whole-
sale payments that ﬂow through deposit
accounts at the Reserve Banks has been
increasing rapidly.  Levels of reserve
requirements have been decreasing, and
contracted clearing balances have picked
up only a portion of that decline.  The size
of unexpected debits and credits, there-
fore, is probably increasing relative to the
size of a bank’s target balance. Of course,
an unexpected shortage, no matter how
large, almost certainly can be offset by
buying extra funds to support a higher bal-
ance on succeeding days.  An unexpected
surplus, however, can be offset only to the
extent that the necessary reduction in
future daily balances would not draw those
future balances below zero.  This
asymmetry may explain the tendency of
many banks to rest content with negative
excess reserve positions early in main-
tenance periods—to avoid building up
surplus positions that are too big to liqui-
date by any means because negative
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balances are frowned upon.  And this may
be why the Trading Desk must adopt
tactics to smooth the daily supply of
balances.  Otherwise, days of peak supply
routinely could impound balances in the
positions of banks that are unable to elimi-
nate all of their surplus.  Clearly, the
concept of excess reserves has an
ambiguous economic identity.  
Ambiguity is not the only source of
imprecision in the current method of
allocating deposits at Reserve Banks among
components of the monetary base.  Published
levels of excess reserves are likely to include
some clearing balances.  The amount that is
subtracted from total balances in addition to
required reserve balances, is not actual hold-
ings of clearing balances, but only the
amount banks contracted to hold.  In the
present low required reserve balance
environment, the difference between a bank’s
contracted and actual clearing balances is
important in that it serves much the same
role as the carry-over provisions of required
reserve accounting.  The ability of banks to
maintain a deposit balance within a target
range, rather than at a unique level, provides
a cushion between demand for balances at
the going funds rate and the quantity of bal-
ances made available through open market
operations.  The existence of a range of bal-
ances at which banks may end up without
penalty acts to buffer the funds rate from
small deviations between the quantity
supplied and the quantity demanded.
Equally important, since 1980, the
Reserve Banks have been rationalizing
nationwide management of the production
and marketing of their services.  Successful
marketing and efﬁcient pricing hinge on
knowledge of the sources of demand for var-
ious services and the public beneﬁts they
produce.  A major issue must be the role of
the clearing balance facility, with its spill-over
effect in monetary policy implementation, in
inﬂuencing the marketability of services.
BETTER DATA FOR A
BETTER UNDERSTANDING
Anderson and Rasche have substanti-
ated empirically the changing uses of
Reserve Bank deposits.  Further reﬁnement
of the revised reserve adjustment magnitude
would be assisted by access to better data.
I don’t mean to imply that the trend rate of
growth of the unadjusted monetary base is
being misstated because of bad data.  The
component uses, not the total sources of
monetary base, are at issue.  Better data
about the clearing balance and excess
reserve uses of the base might assist
Anderson and Rasche in perfecting their
reserve adjustment magnitude.  More
important, however, better data would
contribute to better understanding of high
frequency noise in the market for Reserve
Bank deposits, of the demand for deposit
balances at the Reserve Banks, and of
potential synergies between Reserve Bank
services and monetary policy implementa-
tion.  All these things are becoming
increasingly important as the banking
system manages lower levels of deposit
balances at the Reserve Banks.
The major problem is with current
measures of excess reserves and clearing
balances.  First, the aggregate now labeled
“excess reserves” actually contains the
balances some banks use to meet reserve
requirements.  These are balances that are
maintained in the current period but used to
satisfy requirements in surrounding reserve
maintenance periods in accordance with the
carryover provisions of reserve accounting
regulations.  Similarly, aggregate excess
reserves exclude some balances that are not
used to satisfy current requirements, when
banks use balances from surrounding
periods to meet current period requirements.  
Second, the current measures don’t
distinguish between the amount of
clearing balances banks contract to hold
and the amount they actually hold.  As a
result, some of the balances included in
the reported level of aggregate clearing bal-
ances are not being held to meet con-
tracted clearing balance obligations, while
some of the balances excluded from these
reports are actually being held and earning
interest as such.  The source of this
clearing balance problem is that, as long as
a bank’s average balance for the main-
tenance period lies within the range of its
required reserve balance plus 98 percent to
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102 percent of the amount of its
contracted clearing balance, the bank is
considered to have fulﬁlled the terms of
the clearing balance contract and receives
earnings credits on the actual amount held
in excess of the required reserve balance.
The net amount of these deviations from
contracted amounts can increase or
decrease excess reserves, perhaps by only a
small net amount most of the time.  Thus,
both the carryover provision of the reserve
requirement regulation and the clearing
balance provision of the Reserve Banks’
priced services business more than likely
result in a misclassiﬁcation of a portion of
many banks’ balances.
One way to construct more dis-
criminating measures would be to aggregate
only within sets of banks in common
positions, instead of relying on aggregates
from the consolidated balance sheet of the
twelve Reserve Banks.  Anderson and Rasche
use statistical techniques to suggest which
predetermined sets of banks are likely to be
bound and which are likely to be non-bound
by reserve requirements.  I would suggest
that we compile data differently.  All banks
that maintain deposit balances at a Reserve
Bank must be in one of three categories.2
These categories are distinguished according
to whether an institution’s average maintained
balance for a two-week maintenance period
is more than adequate, adequate, or less 
than adequate with respect to Regulation D
of the Board of Governors, which sets out
the rules for managing a deposit account that
can be used to satisfy both a reserve require-
ment and a clearing balance contract.  The
adequacy test varies with the nature of 
the bank.
REDUCING AMBIGUITY
The rules spelled out in agonizing detail
in Table 1 provide an unambiguous three-
way classiﬁcation of the adequacy of the
deposit balance maintained at a Reserve
Bank by each type of bank.  However, the
adequacy test can be administered only after
a lag of one full maintenance period.  The
descriptions in Table 1 are similar to the
descriptions of current data on page 43 of
Anderson and Rasche, but they are aimed at
deﬁning the adequacy of a balance.
• The ﬁrst set of banks contains
institutions that are not required to
maintain a reserve balance, either
because their deposits are within
the zero requirement range, or
because their vault cash alone 
satisﬁes the reserve requirement.  
If these institutions don’t contract
to maintain a clearing balance, then
any balance they hold in excess 
of zero is more than adequate, a
surplus balance.
• A second set also contains
institutions that are not required to
maintain reserve balances, but they
do contract to hold clearing 
balances.  The adequacy criterion 
for this set is whether an insti-
tution’s balance at a Reserve Bank 
is more than, equal to, or less than
the range of values within the
penalty-free band around its
contracted clearing balance.  A
balance in excess of that range is 
a surplus balance.
•  A third set contains
institutions that may or may not
contract for a clearing balance but
that need balances in addition to
vault cash to satisfy their reserve
requirements, and can take
advantage of Regulation D’s
provisions for carryover.  In this
case, the question is how the
deposit balance, plus applied vault
cash, plus any positive (negative)
reserve position carried forward
from t-1, plus any negative (posi-
tive) position carried forward to
t+1, minus the period t reserve
requirement, compares with the 
penalty-free range of values that sat-
isfy the clearing balance contract (if
any).  A balance in excess of that
range (or of zero, if the bank has no
contracted clearing balance) is a
surplus balance.
2 The three categories discussed
include institutions that may or
may not hold surplus vault
cash.  A fourth set of institu-
tions includes all those with no
deposit balances whatsoever at
a Reserve Bank, whether held
directly or on a pass-through
basis.  These also are likely to
be in a surplus vault cash posi-
tion.  The relevant distinction in
examining excess reserves,
however, is the state of deposit
balances relative to a combined
reserve requirement and con-
tracted clearing balance, one or
the other (but almost never
both) of which may be zero.
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This three-way classiﬁcation of the
adequacy of banks’ deposit balances at the
Reserve Banks in period t could be used to
construct three new aggregate measures.
The ﬁrst of the three new measures, by
aggregating CBt across all banks, would
deﬁne actual aggregate clearing balances
as the total volume of deposits that are
receiving earnings credits. This is currently
a known quantity, but it is not published on
the same frequency as monetary base data,
nor with the same assurance of consistency.
A second new measure would aggregate
St across the three sets of banks for which
surplus balances are greater than zero.
These are true wasted balances, in that they
exceed the volume for receiving earnings
credits, and they exclude balances used to
satisfy reserve requirements in periods (t-1)
through (t+1).  Variations in the volume of
these surplus balances might provide insight
into the “cost” and efﬁciency with which
banks are able to follow central bank rules
for managing reserves and clearing balances.  
The third suggested new measure
would aggregate across the deﬁcits of the
three sets of banks in deﬁcit.  Perhaps this
aggregate is always close to or actually
equal to zero.  If so, that’s useful informa-
tion—again, for gaining insight into the
“cost” and efﬁciency of central bank rules. 
One objection to these suggested
measures might be that information for the
three sets of banks in the crucial third
column of Table 1 would be available only
with a one-period lag, after values for carry-
over were secure.  The question, of course,
is whether to measure what’s relevant, or
what’s contemporaneous, and that’s an
easy one to answer.  
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Table 1
















If Bt -1.02CCBt > 0,
CBt= 1.02CCBt
St = Bt - 1.02CCBt




If Bt - 0.98CCBt < 0,
CBt= Bt
Dt = 0.98CCBt - Bt
If [Bt + AVCt -RRt  - t-1HIt - tXOt+1] - 1.02CCBt > 0,
CBt = 1.02CCBt
St = [ ... ] - 1.02CCBt
If 0 > [Bt + AVCt -RRt  + t-1XIt - tHOt+1] - 0.98 CCBt,
CBt = Bt
Dt = 0.98 CCBt  - [ ...]
If 0.98CCBt < [Bt + AVCt - RRt  - t-1HIt - tXOt+1 + t-1XIt - tHOt+1] <
1.02CCBt,
CBt = [ ... ] 
St = 0
If Bt > 0,
CBt = 0
St = Bt






AVC = applied vault cash 
CB = clearing balance receiving earnings credits
CCB = contracted clearing balance
D = deﬁcit in deposit account
B = maintenance period average deposit balance
HI/HO = shortage carried in/out of period
RR = required reserve
S = surplus in deposit account
XI/XO = excess carried in/out of period
aClearing balances receive earnings credits without penalty if the average balance is within a range of CCB plus or minus 0.02CCB, or
plus or minus $25,000., whichever is larger.  For simplicity, the table ignores the latter possibility.
Type of CustomerAnother objection might be to the
potential cost of collecting new data.  This
doesn’t look like much of a problem.
Undoubtedly, there would be some costs,
but mainly for reprogramming.  All the
micro data already are being collected in
the process of administering the required
reserve and contracted clearing balance
functions of the Reserve Banks.  And that
micro data already is being aggregated in a
variety of ways for the use of those
functions.  The beneﬁts of consistent ofﬁ-
cial publication would come from better
insight into the demand for deposits at
Reserve Banks, both from the vantage
point of monetary policy implementation
tactics and of Reserve Bank provision of
payments services. 
SUMMARY
Anderson and Rasche have performed
two valuable services.  One is their reﬁne-
ment of the St. Louis adjusted monetary
base.  The other, and to my mind at least
an equally signiﬁcant one, has been to doc-
ument that the evolution of central
banking in the United States over the past
sixteen years has left us with outmoded
deﬁnitions and measures of the uses of the
monetary base.  I hope that their work,
and this Symposium, will trigger further
discussions leading to reform, perhaps
along the lines I have suggested.
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